Time and the Soul in Plato, Aristotle, St. Augustine and Ricoeur

Augustine's Confessions, Book XI – Augustine's Theory of Time, the Soul, and It's Reception in Modern Philosophy

Summary of Book XI

Book XI is a mixture of prayer and meditation, where Augustine tries to solve some problems and paradoxes of time. This book of Augustine's Confessions bears the title Time and Eternity, but a more fitting title, as I will show, would perhaps have been Time and the Soul. When quoting from the text, I will refer to the Oxford text's subdivisions (1-41) rather than Augustine's chapters (i-xxxi).

            The text initially begins with a prayer, before focusing more specifically on time, and the so-called Aristotelian paradox of time. Augustine sees a certain conflict in trying to grasp the nature of eternity, wherein God exists, and the nature of time, wherein Man exists. (12) Augustine uses much effort to understand and explain excactly how Man percieves, understands and describes time, in order to better understand the relationship between time and eternity:  "But no time is wholly present. It will see that all past time is driven backwards by the future, and all future time is the consequent of the past, and all past and future are created and set on their course by that which is always present. Who will lay hold on the human heart to make it still, so that it can see how eternity, in which there is neither future nor past, stands still and dictates future and past times?" (13) Augustine obviously develops a theory of time, and in so doing, also creates a theory of the human mind, prefiguring much of modern phenomenology's insight and rhetoric. Concepts such as "Man, the mind, I, we, the human heart, and the soul is used more or less interchangeably, and can be seen as imprecise subdivisions to an epistemology or philosophy of mind.

            Attempting to define time, or put the phenomenon of time into words, Augustine writes "What is time? [...] We surely know what we mean when we speak of it. [...] Provided that no one asks me, I know. If I want to explain it to an inquirer, I do not know. But I confidently affirm myself to know that if nothing passes awy, there is no past time, and if nothing arrives, there is no future time, and if nothing existed, there would be no present time. [...] So indeed we cannot truly say that time exists except in the sense that it tends towards non-existensce." (17) In this way, Augustine argues that time, in a way, is both existent and non-existent. However, he is certain that Man exists in time, and in space. But it is not necessarily human matter as such that percieves or experiences time, but the souls itself, operating as an interlocutor between existent matter and non-existent time. "Human soul, let us see whether present time can be long. To you the power is granted to be aware of intervals of time, and to measure them." (19) There is thus a separation between the soul and it's intuitive understanding of time, and the way in which we transfer understanding into communicable knowledge. Augustine constantly argues that no description or measurement of time, is able to grasp the concept of time satisfactorily, even though our immediate intuition grasps it. Both language, formulas and numbers fall short. Whether or not time itself can be said to exist, Augustine makes the claim that past and future events exist, or at least, will or have existed. "To see what has no existence is impossible. And those who narrate past history would surely be telling a true story if they did not discern events by their soul's insight. If the past were non-existent, it could not be discerned at all. Therefore both future and past events exist." (22) As we see, happenings concerning a time of human existence and thus human experience, can be called events, that can be both memorized (impressed upon the soul) and recollected (gathering of the impressed from the soul). "When a true narrative of the past is related, the memory produces not the actual events which have passed away, but words conveived from images of them, which they fixed in the mind like imprints as they passed through the senses. [...] [W]hen I am recollecting and telling my story, I am looking on its image in present time, since it is still in my memory." (23)

            When Augustine has explained how past events have "existence" in our memories and can be brought into present existence through recollection, he wants to understand in what way future events can be said to exist. When the human mind has "intention" towards the future, we are said to be expecting, waiting, hoping, anticipationg, preparing for, etc. But most important of all, for Augustine, some people are "prophesying". How can this be if future events does not yet exist, readily discernible to the "average" human mind? Augustine never finds a real answer to how prophets are informed, but writes: "Perhaps it would be exact to say: there are tree times, a present of things past, a present of things present, a present of things to come. In the soul there are these three aspects of time, and I do not see them anywhere else. The present considering the past is memory, the present considering the present is immediate awareness, the present considering the future is expectation." (26) However, Augustine has discerned that it is the "soul" that can contemplate time in its past, present and future. And he writes further: "That is why I have come to think that time is simply a distention." (33) We can therefore see how Augustine understands the relation between time and the soul as "distentio animi" (extended soul), as the soul is "outstretched" and "threefold" in time. And further, when the mind actively is recollecting, experiencing or predicting, we can speak of a "intentio animi" (intended soul). Augustine gives an example of how the mind is " intended threefold": "Suppose I am about to recite a psalm which I know. Before I begin, my expectation is directed towards the whole. But when I have begun, the verses from it which I take into the past become the object of my memory. The life of this act of mine is stretched two ways, into my memory because of the words I have already said and into my expectation because of those which I am about to say. But my attention is on what is present: by that the future is transferred to become the past." (38)

            To discern between time and eternity, and how the soul serves as an interlocutor between the two, we can imagine "the soul" as being somewhere between the mind that exists in time and movement (the classic four physical dimensions) within God that exists or is in Eternity (imagine a transcendant fifth dimension). A prophet would thus be "informed" because God used his/her soul as an interlocutor, as a prophet would be divinely "chosen" to have his/her soul extended miraculously into the future. We can see that Augustine not only is able to make an interesting anatomy of how the soul and prophesy works, but also enriches our understanding of the human mind and it's grasp of time, preceding modern phenomenology.

Time in Plato and Aristotle

Plato's view of time is not intertwined with the mind in the same way as with Augustine. However, Plato offers a description of time in a dialogue about the creation of the world, Timaeus. "And so he began to thing of making a moving image of eternity: at the same time as he brought order to the universe, he would make an eternal image, moving according to number, of eternity remaining in unity. This number, of course, is what we noe call "time". For before the heavens came to be, there were no days or nights, no months or years. But now, at the same time as he framed the heavens, he devised their coming to be. There all are parts of time, and was and will be are forms of time that have come to be." (Tim. 37d-e) furher: [...] [W]e also say things like these: that what has come to be is what has come to be, that what is coming to be is what is coming to be, and also that what will come to be is what will come to be, and that what is not is what is not. None of these expressions of ours is accurate. But I don't suppose this is a good time right now to be too meticulous about these matters." (Tim. 38b) As we can see, Plato neither describes time's effect on humans, nor does he give a very helpful investigation into time at all. He obviously had little time for time.

            A more modern theory of time is given in Aristotle's Physics, where time is treated as a merely physical phenomenon. "Hence time is not movement, but only movement in so far as it admits of enumeration. [...] Time then is a kind of number." (Phys. 219b) As with Augustine, Aristotle more or less sees time as being divided between present and future. But time is always relative to moving bodies, and therefore understood and described through physics, as points in time, lines, numbers and so on, and not as perceived by Man, other than it being measured. (Phy 220a-222a) "It is also worth considering how time can be related to the soul; and why time is thought to be in everything, both in earth and in sea and in heaven. It is because it is an attribute, or state, or movement (since it is the number of movement) and all these things are movable (for they are all in place), and time and movement are together, both in respect of potentiality and in respect of actuality? Whether if soul did not exist time would not exist or not, is a question that may fairly be asked; for if there cannot be some one to count there cannot be anything that can be counted, so that evidently there cannot be number; for number is either what has been, or what can be, counted. But if nothing but soul, or in soul reason, is qualified to count, there wouold not be time unless there were soul, but only that of which time is an attribute i.e. if movement can exist without soul, and the before and after are attributes of movement, and time is these qua numerable." (Phy 223a) It is important to note here, and as we shall see later, that the soul of Aristotle is not the same as the soul of Augustine. For Aristotle, the soul is a physical lifeforce present in all living things, while for Augustine, the soul is immaterial and spiritual.

Soul in Plato and Aristotle           

Plato's theory of the memory is a clear influence upon Augustine's theory of the mind, consisting as it were of "impressions" made upon the soul. However, Plato's soul is always already in a state of reincarnation and rebirth, and the soul in a way already posess hidden knowledge waiting to be recollected. The notion of "lethe" is used to describe the constant forgetfulness and uncovering of memories.

            Annas (2003) describes how Plato sees the body and soul as to distinct features, and his dualist theory holds the souls and body as two radically different things (Annas 2003: 65) She explains further that the soul is immortal, but that Plato offers some conflicting views on whether the soul controls the body, or whether the soul is in a way trapped by the body. Indeed, "[t]here is no one consistent account, however general uniting everything that Plato says about the soul. (Annas 2003: 66-67) The most relevant aspect in this case, however, is that view of the soul and the body that has most strongly affected Christian thinkers: "Plato tends to contrast the soul with the body; in describing our psychological life and quest for knowledge he often sees these as competing forces, always to the disadvantage of the body. This is one reason why his ideas appealed to the ascetic Church Fathers, who interpreted the scriptural contrast of spirit and flesh as the Platonic contrast of sharply opposed soul and body, thus having a drastic effect on Western Christianity's attitude to the body. (Annas 2003: 70) Furthermore, Plato also, like Augustine, talks more or less interchangeably of the soul and the mind, as both soul and the mind are capable of interpreting sensory impressions, although some of these sensory impressions are merely to be regarded as "dreams", and not belonging to the world of ideas. (Annas 2003: 72-73)

            In contrast to Augustine and Plato, Aristotle's view of the soul is purely based in the physical world, and the soul is regarded as a physical part of the body. Although "psychê" in Aristotle is often translated as "the soul", Barnes (2000) emphasizes that "Aristotle does indeed include those features of the higher animals which later thinkers associate with the soul. But "soul" is a misleading translation. It is a truism that all living things - prawns and pansies no less than men an gods - possess a psuchê; but it would be odd to suggest that a prawn has a soul, and odder to ascribe souls to pansies. Since a psuchê is what animates, or gives life to, a living thing, the word "animator" [...] might be used." (Barnes 2000: 105) While Plato and Augustine has a "supernatural" explanation to how the soul works, Aristotle holds the soul to be of a physical quality, and a philosophy of the soul is necessarily grounded in the physiological. "The "principles" or powers of the soul are corporeal principles - to be animated is to be a body with certain capacities. Hence to suppose that those capacities could exist outside any body is as absurd as to imagine that walking could take place apart from any legs." (Barnes 2000: 108) We can therefore hardly assume that Aristotle's soul is capable of things like immortality, reincarnation, divination and prophesying. However, when speaking of "the intellect", we can assume that Aristotle has in mind something more akin to our modern concept of the soul, and indeed Plato and Augustine's concept of the soul as "eternal". The "active intellect" is for Aristotle "seperable and impassive and unmixed, being essentially actuality ... And when separated it is just what it is, and it alone is immortal and eternal." (Aristotle, quoted in Barnes 2000: 108-109) Thus, the "active intellect" can, as it were, inform the "passive intellect" of knowledge that transcend and survive time and space, but would not have fruition without being received and acted upon by the passive intellect or the physical psyche. Knowledge and active intellect is therefore a metaphysical "potential" that will or will not be actualized, and thus similar to how Plato and Augustine describes the "soul".

Augustine in Contemporary Philosophy

The French philosopher Paul Ricoeur was strongly influenced by Augustine in creating a theory of narrative, especially Book XI. Although his theory was a synthesis of Augustine and Aristotle, the Aristotelian influence is not overly relevant to this paper.

            Ricoeur sees a universal structure to all narrative, and developes his theory on narrative in Time and Narrative 1-3 (1984-1988) In his work, he looks at how narratives work and gives new meaning to time through a creative composition of time in stories, just as the composition of words created meaning through methaphors. As a narratological concept, the word "story" has recieved wide-ranging definitions, to more specific definitions concerning a specific, literary phenomenon. For Ricoeur, a story is an act that creates meaning through its arrangement of time: "With narrative, the semantic innovation lies in the inventing of another work of synthesis - a plot. By means of the plot, goals, causes, and chance ar brought together within the temporal unity of a whole and complete action. It is this synthesis of the heterogenous that brings narrative close to metaphor. In both cases, the new thing - the as yet unsaid, the unwritten - springs up in language. Here a living metaphor, that is, a new pertinence in the predication, there a feigned plot, that is, a new congruence in the organization of events." (Ricoeur 1984: ix) Ricoeur creates a theory of narration by sythesizing ideas of Augustine an Aristotle, as well as other influential philosophers such as Jacques Derrida, Martin Heidegger and Gilles Deleuze. In the first three chapters of Time and Narrative 1, he attempts to combine Augustine's notion of "distentio animi" and Aristoteles' concepts mimesis and muthos. His synthesis of these can be said to be a phenomenological understanding of narration.

            Because he emphasizes Man's experience of time, Ricoeur is interested in the phenomenological perception of time. Man can be said to liv in a linear time consisting of past, present and future. In the chapter "The Experience of Time" in Time and Narrative 1, Ricoeur shows how Augustine explains that Man not only lives in and experiences the present, but also in the past and future, because of the threefold distention of the soul. For Ricoeur, this theory of the soul might explain how narration, being a human action, is able to convey universal messages about life itself, because narration, according to Ricoeur, speaks of universal situations, and is based on human action taking place in time: "Time becomes human to the extent that it is articulated through a narrative mode, and a narrative attains its full meaning when it becomes a condition of temporal existence." (Ricoeur 1985: 52). Ricoeur creates a model of a "threefold mimesis", and names the parts mimesis 1-3, where mimesis 1 means prefiguration, namely that the author has a prefigured understanding of human action, and Man's being in time, which is shared with the reader. "Upon this preunderstanding, common to both poets and their readers, emplotment is constructed and, with it, textual and literary mimetics" (Ricoeur 1985: 64) The text, mimesis 2 (configuration) is thereby read by the reader or "hermeneut", whereby mimesis 3 (refiguration) entails the reader's understanding of and inspiration by the text.

Soul, time and contemporary life

So let's look at someone like Judith Butler uses the concept of "gendering" as a formative power in identities, or, even more recently, Karen E. Fields and the notion of "racecrafting", meaning that racism itself creates percieved differences in identity rather than the other way around. Similarly, wouldn't the Augustinian synthesis of time and soul, work similarly in creating "historical subjects" today. A people or nation, broadly speaking, shares an identity not only in a singular point in time and space, but is, so to speak, "timespaced" threefold. A Jewish identity would refer to localizable events through history, their present situation, and their so-called "messianic" expectations. Therefore, the Augustinian timespaced subject is not necessarily concern the individual psyche, but potentially the notion of belonging to a people with a shared past, present and destiny.

            Personally, I feel that a theory of identity, or an ethics centered on the primacy of some belonging to a "one", or oriented from a specific evil lack the necessary universality required for it to be a proper ethics. Although Augustine is right in arguing that an identity is rooted in memories, histories, presence and future, a theory of the soul as an active lifeforce must always already be rooted in the immanent rather than transcendant (e.g. mythic or messianic) realm. Although Augustine paints a beautiful metaphoric picture, creating an "aesthetic of truth", his philosophy could be a "fall from immanence and life" rather than viewing much of life as a falling from the "transcendent and good".

Bibliography

Annas, Julia Plato - A Very Short Introduction Oxford University Press 2003

Saint Augustine Confessions Oxford University Press 1991

Barnes, Jonathan Aristotle - A Very Short Introduction Oxford University Press 2000

Plato Timaeus in Complete Works Hackett Publishing Company 1997

Ricoeur, Paul Time and Narrative Vols. 1-3 University of Chicago Press 1984-1988

Dags- og ukepresse på tomgang

Jeg har ikke rent lite empati for anmeldere som formodentlig lever av å "lese seg nedover" som det heter i Bernhard Ellefsens kommentar i Morgenbladet den 22. mars. Jeg har ikke spesielt sterke meninger i noen forlagsdebatt, men har selv vært Morgenbladet-abonnent i mange år. Selv om Morgenbladet er blant de beste, eller minst dårligste kulturaviser i Norge i dag, har dette vært en tiltagende trist, meningsløs og kostbar affære. Men hvis noe skal sies om forlagenes formidling av bøker som fremkaller bipolare reaksjoner hos leseren (bøkene som får deg til å le og gråte), og et økt behov for te og samtidig pledd, må man også peke anklagende mot anmelderes manglende streikevilje mot disse bøkene. Anmelderne har en ofte utakknemlig rolle som litteraturformidlingens sosialarbeidere og natteravner. Og de er, etter skrytet på omslagene å dømme, ofte meget godt i stand til å ta vare på, og skryte frem åpenbart forferdelig litteratur.
Det blir, som med dagspressens anmeldere, åpenbare problematiske følger ved å skulle være tildelt en fast spalteplass, enten det måtte være i Morgenbladet eller andre aviser. Man ender fort opp som en meningsprostituert som ikke bare skal si noe om bedre litterær fiksjon eller nye spennende tenkere, men må også regelmessig si noe om det rene idioti og barbari som foregår i forlagsbransje, politikk, kunst, osv.
Mye av Ellefsens kritikk går ut på at de store forlagene, i kraft av å ha et kulturbærende ansvar, handler galt når de tenker økonomisk profitt fremfor en tenkt nasjonalt omspennende dannelsesprofitt. Til det vil nok mange parere med at "selv" Morgenbladet de siste par årene i tiltagende grad har gått fra å være en intellektuell kulturavis med gode og interessante skribenter, til å bli et stadig voksende avløpsrør for noen få høyt utdannede menneskers åpenbare skrivediaré. Flere og flere faste spalter bærer preg av å være bestillingsverk, hvor skribentene ofrer substans til fordel for antall ord, ironier, sarkasmer og banaliteter.
Jeg oppfordrer til å tenke først, og skrive siden.

Om Ragnhild Fjellros innlegg i Klassekampen den 11. mars

En kronikk i Klassekampen forsøkte å ta opp en debatt om det problematiske forholdet mellom Jens Bjørneboes liv og hans verk, eller kanskje mer spesifikt hvordan vi i dagens samfunn, som litteraturhistorikere, biografer, litteraturvitere, etc. "bruker" Bjørneboe som et symbol på et korsfareri for de svakes sak.
Personlig er forfattere og alle andres privatliv noe jeg i forsvinnende liten grad er opptatt av, men jeg kan allikevel slutte meg til Ragnhild Fjellros kritikk av hvordan vi kan bagatellisere og fortie overgrep, spesielt når de begås av forfattere og kunstnere. Og da burde det, slik det antydes av henne, ikke være noen formildende omstendighet at man lager kunst og litteratur om det i etterkant.
Selv om det i dag ikke lenger er en del av folkebevisstheten, var dette også kjente problemer i Bjørneboes samtid, men kanskje noe man må sitte flere dager med microfilmer for å få oversikt over. Også en feministisk kritikk av Bjørneboes litteratur, og delvis også av Bjørneboe selv, kan for eksempel finnes hos Ottil Tharaldsen i "Kvinnesyn og mannsrolle i fire romaner av Jens Bjørneboe" (UiB 1974) Bjørneboe og hans fire bøker kom ikke spesielt godt ut av lesningen etter Tharaldsens syn, men lesningen bar også preg av sin tid. Lesningens vitenskap var dårligere utviklet og det som i dag er kjente begreper i litteraturvitenskapen, det autorale, intensjonale og affektive feilgrep, var da en norm snarere enn en synd. Man så, som mange dessverre også gjør i dag, gudbevaremegvel, ikke noen meningsbærende skiller mellom fiksjon og virkelighet og forteller/karakterer og forfatter. Verkene i "Bestialitetens historie" er for eksempel fortalt av en fiksjonell forteller med noen få fellestrekk med Bjørneboe, men er ikke identisk med Bjørneboe. I "Stillheten" ville man i så fall finne sterke skyts for å anklage Bjørneboe for å flørte med, eller bagatellisere pedofili, når fortelleren er i møte med en mindreårig pike som forsøker å prostituere seg til fortelleren. Den samme fortelleren kan gjennom hele "Bestialitetens historie" anklages for å være pederast, voldtektsmann, rasist, etc., og dette var også kontroversielle karaktertrekk da bøkene kom ut. Denne kritikken dør kanskje ut så lenge det ikke repeteres nok i biografier og litteraturhistorier.
Min egen teori da jeg leste Bjørneboe, med en fare for å begå nok et feilgrep, var at mange av Bjørneboes verker var skrevet som ledd i en personlig og offentlig syndsforlatelse, ved å plassere noen av sine egne synder og laster hos karakterene sine, som de gjennom fortellingene måtte utvikle seg til å bli større enn. Slik sett kan spesielt trilogien "Bestialitetens historie" leses som en svært personlig og åndelig utviklingsroman som også er nært knyttet til vår felles historie, som europeere. Har man derfor i mente at Bjørneboes og fortellerens synder er et ledd i en lengre fortelling, og i et større utviklingsbilde, vil man kanskje etterhvert finne noen positive budskap og finne rom for tilgivelse av kanskje både forfatteren og fortelleren.
Etter å ha lest om Bjørneboe og hans literatur, har det vokst frem en delvis forakt for mannen, en delvis fascinasjon for myten, og en større beundring for verket. Min mening er at Bjørneboe klarte å løse problemer i fiksjonen som han aldri klarte å løse i sin egen levetid. Det er et imperativ for leseren å aktualisere ideene man selv finner verdifulle i forfatterskapet.

For de som er spesielt interessert i "Bestialitetens historie" av Jens Bjørneboe

Kan jeg henvise til http://munin.uit.no/handle/10037/3998 "Lesning av Frihetens øyeblikk (1966), Kruttårnet (1969), og Stillheten (1973) av Jens Bjørneboe med spesielt henblikk på fortellerens prosjekt. Paul Ricoeurs Time and Narrative brukes fortrinnsvis som teoretisk grunnlag for lesningen." 

Aktantmodeller for "Bestialitetens historie"

Om Tor Ulven, og kanskje litt om poesi i det hele tatt

Tor Ulven

Jeg har lenge ville skrive noe om Tor Ulven, men etter å ha lest og tiet i mange år, vet jeg bare at man enten kan si for mye eller for lite. Allikevel:

Som når filosofien er, som Badiou har kalt den "tanke om tanke", er Ulvens poesi alltid "språk om språk". Den er et språk om seg selv, men uten noen virkelig mening eller referent. Diktene er ikke om noe annet enn seg selv. Så selv om dette tilsynelatende gåtefulle, eller meningsladede bak ordene "monumentet er et monument over sin egen glemsel", tilsynelatende skjuler en slags visdom, er det kanskje ikke ment som noe annet enn å være en uutgrunnelig meditasjon om ord, med ord. Richard Feynman sa nettopp at "I think I can safely say that nobody understands quantum mechanics." Og man kan vel også trygt si at ingen forstår eller kan forstå Ulvens poesi. Poesien sier bestandig for mye og for lite, både hvisker, skriker, brøler og gråter om alt og ingenting.

Fra Tor Ulven Stein og speil - mixtum compositum (1995):

Utstilling I

(utkast til minnesperke)

Monumentet er et monument over sin egen glemsel. Og får mening først når det ikke finnes noen som kan gi det mening. Det er steinen du holder i hånden. Som du aldri når inn til. Bare speilet viser riktig tid. Når steinen speiler seg, er det ikke av forfengelighet. Speilet røper alt, steinen ingenting. Som stein og speil er det du helst vil vite.

Social Function of the Old and New Attic Comedy

Social Function of the Old and New Attic Comedy

A Comparative Analysis of the Old and New Attic Comedy with Emphasis on Genre and Social Function

Introduction

My intention is to look at how the comedy genre develops from the Old Attic Comedy to the New Attic Comedy, and show how some of these changes may have their roots in the development of society. First and foremost, I will introduce Markus Asper's theory on the old attic comedy's political function, and thereby look at how some of his arguments may be used when studying the new comedy. Then I will give an overview of the changing social context from the old to the new comedy, and the related shifts in themes and tone that is reflected in my reading of The Misanthrope. I will also look at how themes in The Misanthrope fits together with its social context, especially with regards to issues concerning marriage and gender roles.

Markus Asper on the political function of the old attic comedy

In the article "Group Laughter and Comic Affirmation: Aristophanes' Birds and the Political Function of Old Comedy" (Asper 2005), Asper illustrates what kind of audience one might have expected to see in the theatre in the 5th century B.C. The Dionysus Theatre held and audience of 15 000, which meant that around half of the people eligible to vote were able to see each play. Because of a costly entrance fee, Asper believes that this created a separation where the audience consisted mainly of the 15 000 Athenians that were the richest. Additionally, Asper believes that, in order to win, the dramatist had to please the majority of these. Ergo, the dramatist would ideally have to please 15 000 of the richest Athenians through more or less through cajolery. (Asper 2005: 5-6)

            With these demographic data in mind, Asper argues that the old attic comedy was not as critical and satirical as previously thought, but had an affirmative stance to the ruling order of society, instead of undermining and making fun of the status quo. Asper attempts to balance the view of Aristophanes' comedies as adopting a message of pacifism (Asper 2005: 8-9) and being in conflict with religious cults (Asper 2005: 10-11). Rather than portraying the characters as identical to the upper-class audience one might see at the theatres, the protagonist often stands in conflict with the audience's views. The protagonist is also likely to belong to a lower class than the audience. In The Birds, we nevertheless see a charachter the audience can identify with, which makes The Birds a "fantasy of power", and it is a comedy that "led [Athenian citizens] to understand this as an amusing and openly flattering fantasy concerning their own ambition." (Asper 2005: 17) The view of The Birds as being an escapistic or anarchic play therefore has to be reconsidered.

            Asper means that, generally speaking, one wouldn't stage a play in Athens that differed too much from the dominating values within the institutional context of the theatre. By looking at several comedies in addition to The Birds, Asper illustrates how these comedies have a plot whereby an Athenian with an overly utopic idea is allowed to act out on his ideas. (Asper 2005: 19) One might say that the revolutions and utopias one might see in the old Attic comedies often would seem absurd in their time, that they only functioned as comedy, and not as political satire. Aristophanes seems to be making clowns out of those people that desires radical changes to society.

            In addition to claiming that the old comedy is affirmative, Asper also argues that the old comedy makes fun of eccentric individuals. Even though a standard interpretation of this motive, is to show it's didactic and excemplary (negatively so) function, Asper argues that the ridicule of eccentrism in the comedy works more as a signifying line between good Athenians and Athenians that deviate from the norms. The jokes are also oriented out of a burgoise identity, and is directed at what deviates from this identity. (Asper 2005: 19-20) Even though Athenian citizens laugh together, they laugh at and down at what is displayed on the stage. One should be aware that the jokes in the ancient comedy are not spontaneous as such, but are an expected part of a larger ritual. Mary Douglas claims that the nature of a joke depends on it's social context. There is a difference between spontaneous jokes and the kind of jokes one might see in a ritual context. The joke attains an affirmative character as it is part of a rite, and «the message of a standard rite is that the ordained patterns of social life are inescapable.» (Douglas 1999: 155) Furthermore, Douglas emphasizes that jokes are collective and network-affirmative, even though the function and content of the joke is variable. For Asper, the audience of the old comedy was this kind of group, whose unity was strengthened by laughter directed against the (seemingly) absurd and impossible. (Asper 2005: 22-24)

            In conclusion, we can say the following about Aspers view of the old comedy: The comedy is affirmative, consisting of jokes where there is a normative view of Athenian citizens. The comedy creates laughter and ridicule around rebellion against the citizens' identity or the structure of society. It is expected that only the upper class of society laughs at this, but not society as a whole. (Asper 2005: 24)

Context and themes in the new comedy

From Aristophanes' The Birds (414 b.c.), Aspers main example of the old comedy, to Menander's The Misanthrope (316 b.c.), there were several important political and cultural changes that, I will claim, affected the comedy as a genre. The form and content of the comedy is affected by the transformation from an Attic to a Hellenic culture. The transformation from a democratic rule to a more aristocratic rule also converges with a transformation from political themes to love intrigues as a subject for comedy. Just as Asper sees affirmative traits to the old comedy, traits of an affirmative character are also possible to find in the new comedy. This is a point of view that is also held by Brockett & Hildy:

«But in recent years some critics have come to view these plays as works that have questioned and then reaffirmed certain societal conventions during a period when values and mores were being challenged. Thus, they treat the plays as reflections of prevailing ideology rather than merely frivolous, diversionary entertainment.» (Brockett & Hildy 2010: 34)

It is also important to not that the social conventions of the old comedies have faded away. There is, to a higher degree, burgoise characters that are dominant, and the plot often centers on intrigues concerning these people's status and future. For example, there is a potential threat to a rich family's honour that we see in The Misanthrope. To fall in love with a girl of uncertain identity and social status is a threat to a society where political power no longer is democratic, but more hierarchical. Therefore, young men's love affairs may pose a larger threat to patriarchal families than what we would feel in contemporary western society. Additionally, women gaining power as in Lysistrata or Assemblywomen, or grouches that won't help the affluent society as in The Misanthrope, are not just threathening and exciting as plots, but could represent agitating eccentrism in their time. Through comedy, the subversive and «impossible» could go on for as long as the play lasted. But to an audience in Athens, certain elements of the plays must have seemed like science fiction. Women's suffragette didn't get to Greece before 1952. Instead of the feminist coup in Lysistrata and Assemblywomen, The Misanthrope concerns a less politically tense subject, the question of whether or not two citizens should or swhouldn't get married. A problematic aspect we can see in The Misanthrope, is how a society based and structured around agriculture is dependant on cooperation. Gary Reger writes the following on agriculture and The Misanthrope:

For the most part, productive labour was excercised by individuals and their families on their own farms, as the Grouch in Menander's play, who eschewed even the help of his neighbours (lines 328-31). But even in the sphere of self-efficient agriculture, the rhythms of labour demand were such that farmers must have depended at harvest time on the assistance of others, whether mutual help of neighbours or the services of paid seasonal labourers [...] (Reger 2003: 335)

We can clearly see how Knemon's role is provocative in a Hellenistic society that tries to be a society where many individuals cooperate in one way or another. As we shall later see, Knemon is not only at the edge, but radically outside of this society. His anti-materialistic views does not only punish himself, but is also a potential threat towards neighbours, as he can't even help them by lending tools (because he doesn't have any) and is, because of his isolationism, in danger of not getting help from his neighbours when he falls into the well. The eccentric and outsider Knemon represents not only a farmer on the periphery of Athenian society, but demonstrates an obstinacy that could possibly materialize itself as concrete threats to the structure of Hellenistic society. Knemons isolation from the society around him can be understood as anarchy and in opposition towards society's basic morals.

            It is also important to note the opposition in class that becomes apparent between the countryside and the city. In The Misanthrope, a large part of the dialogue is dominated by antagonism between people from the polis and people from the countryside. The polis consists of flaneurs and dandys, while the countryside consists of hard workers and voluntary or involuntary ascetics. The suspicion against affluence is clear from the beginning of the play, when Gorgias sees Sostratos wearing a "smart cloak":

Gorgias: The man in the smart cloak - Is that the one you mean?

Daos: Yes.

Gorgias: Clearly a rogue from his expression! (221-222)

When meeting Sostratos, Gorgias still holds onto his preconceptions. He believes Sostratos to be a burgeoise young man from the polis who is only visiting the countryside to loiter and exploit young girls:

Gorgias: ... My message, then is this: You may be very rich, but don't you bank on it, don't trample either, on us down-and-outs! Always show onlookers that you deserve a durable prosperity!

Sostratos: You feel I'm doing something now that's out of place?

Gorgias: You've set your heart, I think, on a foul deed. You're hoping to seduce an innocent free girl, or looking for a chance to do an action for which you deserve the sentence of a thousand deaths! (225-227)

Herein lies much of the play's conflict. A young man from the countryside accuses a naive dandy from the Polis for wanting to rape his sister: "There is a boy whose father's very rich and farms land here wirth many talents. This boy lives in town, but he's come with a sportsman friend to hunt and accidentally reached this very spot." (189) It is uncertain where Sostratos normally lives, in polis or the country estate. Before Sostratos has done anything wrong, Gorgias is on guard against him, and accuses him of having dishonorable intentions. In this play, we see that a lot of prejudices and complications are laid open from the beginning. As we eventually see, the prejudices against people from the polis is false, and even burgoise people can have good intentions. For, as we learn, Sostratos wants an honorable marriage, even without a dowry.

The Misanthrope

The Misanthrope was first performed ca. 316 b.c., and represents a change in Greek comedy. The Misanthrope is the only complete comedy of Menander, and the only complete play of new comedy altogether. I will briefly summarize the play and identify some changes to the genre.

The play is introduced with a prologue by Pan. Pan lives in a cave nearby the farm of the misanthropic Knemon, who has married a widow, with whom he has a daughter, in addition to a son from the widow's previous marriage. The daughter has done well in sacrificing to the nymphs, and as a gesture of gratitude, Pan makes Sostratos fall in love with her.

In Act I, Sostratos is out hunting with his sceptical friend Chaireas, who is described in the play's vignette as a «sychophant-flatterer». Chaireas acts as a representative of cynicism and common sense, and is concerned with the girl's status and identity, while Sostratos is impatient and filled with desire. Sostratos sends a slave, Pyrrhias, to speak to the girl's father, Knemon. Pyrrhias soon gets chased from the estate, and runs back to Sostratos, frightened. He has met the hard working and aching Knemon, and has been chased from the estate.

            Knemon's daughter goes to the cave to get water because Simiche has lost a bucket into the well while trying to get water. Daos, a slave of Gorgias (Knemon's stepson and the girl's brother), gets worried as he sees Sostratos handing the pot of water to the girl inside the cave. Daos goes to Gorgias to tell him that something fishy is going on between Sostratos and Knemon's daughter.

In act II, Gorgias and Daos is discussing. We learn that Knemon wants nothing to do with Gorgias, and that he has cut off his ties to the rest of the world and his married family, except his daughter. Gorgias criticizes Sostratos because of his flamboyant looks and expensive cape. Gorgias is worried that Sostratos has come, as a rich man, to exploit poor farmers. He also suspects Sostratos of being posessed by Pan, thus wanting to rape Knemon's daughter. Gorgias also says that Sostratos, being a rich man, is the type of person that uses his spare time to exploit hardo working people. Sostratos, on the other hand, explains that his intentions are noble. He wants to marry Gorgias' sister, and offers to do this without dowry. Gorgias then warns him about her father. He has no slaves except for the slave Simiche, and struggles to run his farm without help. Knemon only has his daughter for company and wants, according to Gorgias, only to marry somebody like himself. Gorgias therefore persuades Sostratos to appear as a worker himself, so that Knemon will act in a friendly manner towards him. The slave Daos is therefore appointed to be his boss for a day in carnevalesque fashion.

            After a worrying dream, where Sostratos' mother sees him in chains, she sends the cook Sikon and the slave Getas to make an offering to Pan near Knemons farm. This offering is carried through in order to make Sostratos' fate look brighter.

            In act III, Sostratos' mother arrives with Sikon and Getas to make the offering. When Getas discovers that they have forgotten a pot for the offering, they knock on Knemon's door, which, true to his character neither has anything to lend away nor wanting to help because of his grouchiness. This goes on while Sostratos has been working hard all day without being noticed by Knemon.

In Act IV, Simiche comes with the message that Knemon has fell down the well. Gorgias and Sostratos helps Knemon out of the well. After this terrifying experience, Knemon explains the advantages and disadvantages of being alone. As a gesture of gratitude, he makes Gorgias his heir and leaves the responsibility of his daughter's future in Gorgias' hands. Thus, Gorgias must himself find a husband for his sister.

            In act V, the final act, Sostratos wants Gorgias to marry Sostratos' sister, which entails a sort of dowry in return for Sostratos to marry Gorgias' sister. Kallippides, Sostratos' father is of the opinion that Gorgias is too poor to marry his daughter. Sostratos then holds a moralizing speech about money. Money and wealth is only good if it serves the many, and if one helps the poor with one's affluence. Kallippides agrees with this. Gorgias overhears this conversation and gets even more impressed with Sostratos. Towards the beginning of the act, there is a banquet to celebrate, where Sikin and Getas returns and jokingly harrasses Knemon, by making the injured old man dance.

Features of the new Attic comedy

A new feature with the new comedy's structure, at least according to The Misanthrope, is that it is divided into five acts. The choir has lost it's active part in the plot and is only used as a kind of intermission entertainment or light musical pieces throughout the play, marked in the text with «choir» or «intermission with the choir». There is therefore not an active interaction between choir and individual characters as in the old comedy, which was a regular feature in both the old tragedy and comedy. A study of Menandric fragments before the publication of the complete The Misanthrope also indicates that the use of only three actors was abandoned in the new comedy, as Kelly Rees argued in 1910, before the complete The Misanthrope was discovered: There is absolutely no trace of hint in the economy of these fragments of a restriction in the number of available performers.. [but it should be noted that] we have no positive information on the subject. (Rees 1910: 292, my italics) This at least implies a development in the use of more actors than before, unless (something Rees does not take into consideration) the speedily changing of masks between three actors was already used as a comic effect on Menander's time. This is now a known technique in modern theatre and comedy, wherein travesty and farcical situations around transvesticism or other role changes is used as a comic technique. In a later article about the same subject, «The Distribution of Parts in Menander's Dyskolos», it is suggested that:

«Either four principal actors are needed or, alternatively, that three actors can carry the major roles between them, provided that the part of Getas is split between two of them and that a supernumary actor is available for two small parts, together with parachoregemata in a few places and a kophon prosopon twice. (Griffith 1960: 113)

It can also be mentioned that the old comedy's light and spontaneaous rhythm is replaced with a tighter, more «Aristotelian» plot instead of an almost incoherent display where the action is excessive and surrealistic, and where the jokes come thick and fast. The joke in the comedy of Menander is often relegated in favour of the comic plot (situation comedy), which not necessarily is comical in itself anymore. The comic in comedy is often set aside from an easily accessible level of outright jokes to small interludes in the action which are not strictly or by necessity related to the overall conflict or the characters in the situation. In The Misanthrope, we generally see «fun» when the cook and the slave is present, often conversing with Knemon or with each other. They are more or less like a pair of circus clowns that act as comic relief.

            In Eitrem's introduction to Menander, it is said that «The so-called «old comedy» was too marked by it's time, and simply too vulgar for a Hellenistic audience.» (Menander: 7) By this he meant that some of the phallic symbolism and use of costumes in the old comedy was gone. The jokes in The Misanthrope are not sexually explicit, and there are not a use of fart-jokes and latrine humour as in the old comedy. It is said that «Menander, on the other hand, with his sophisticated language and culture, was fit for the youth of this new era», a claim that harmonizes with the thesis that the greek comedy is affirmative, even though it doesn't appear in the excact same ritual frame as before. The comedy in it's new form is neither especially excessice , jokey og explicit. The world in the new comedy is not turned on it's head, but told more or less as it is. But we see to a larger degree the use of generalized «types» of people, as both successful and misfit stock-characters. In The Misanthrope, we see several types recognizable from Teophrastus' work on moral characters. Menander doesn't use many of these extensively, but has developed his own stock-characters, and has named plays after them. There is uncertainty on whether or not Menander was directly influenced by Teophrastus. (Menander 1995: 8, McMahon 1929: esp. 25) Aside from «the misanthrope» in The Misanthrope, we see plays based on characters such as the farmer, the hero, the flatterer and the drunkard. The most easily recognizable charicatures in The Misanthrope are Chaireas as the «parasite» and the «flatterer». In The Misanthrope, Chaireas is a parasitical sidekick, but does not fit easily into the «flatterer» role. He is mostly sceptical and prejudiced. J. O. Lofberg examines something close to this character in the article «The Sycophant-parasite», where the sycophant-parasite is described as a hired professional that works as a flatterer for rich people. (1920) In that case, the publication of the full version of The Misanthrope in 1957 must have at least complicated the view of this stock-character, at least as it is used in the new comedy. Chaireas appears to have little in common with the parasite/flatterer as is presented in Lofberg's other sources, which are historical sources and Menander-fragments. L.A. Post writes similarly about this mysterious attribution of denotations about roles for the characters: «Chaireas is listed among the dramatis personae as a parasite. This does not justify jumping to the conclusion that he is a kolax «flatterer», an areskos «purveyor of compliments», or an alazon «boastful». [...] It is Sicon the cook who fits these labels.» (Post 1963: 37)

            We also have the characters Knemon as «the misanthrope», Sicon as «the cook» and Simiche as «the old hag». Two of the characters, Sostratos and Gorgias, is on the other hand presented as virtuous and complex characters. The stock characters that recur in several comedies have taken the place of the named, real people one made fun of in the old comedy. We don't see any cases of direct speech to the audience either, as was normal in the old comedy (the fourth wall was apparently broken long before Diderot and Brecht). But it is important to note that even though the play made fun of specific types and professions, the upper class seems spared of ridicule. The ridicule of the new comedy is directed downwards, rather than upwards.

            The view of the comedy as a ventilating act[1], where the order of society is inverted and the low class ridicules the higher class is therefore not fitting of the new comedy. The themes of the comedy changes from grand politics, concerning the people that went to the democratic assembly, to the individual, familiar and romantic, which concerned the Hellenistic audience, where society became less democratic. It is obvious that the function of the new comedy was meant to be didactical and adapted to youth, as Eitrem writes (Menander 1962: 7), rather than transgressive latrine humour the audience could laugh at. While the obscenities are ventilating in a society with otherwise strict norms, the new comedy instead becomes overbearing and moralizing. While the old comedy shows us a society that is brought out of order without being restored, we see people that make mistakes and learn necessary lessons in the new comedy.

            We also clearly see that the plot adapts to the development of society. The power of the old comedy, the democratic assembly, is replaced by family ties and patriarchal values in The Misanthrope. The pride that came of being an Athenian or from a polis, is also directed against suspicious characters on the periphery of Athenian society, in the countryside. The misanthrope or the hermit are represented as suspicious anti-Athenians that are not only people sceptical towards urbane or rich people, like Gorgias, but people who establish their own anarchic territories in the countryside, where Athenian law and moral is abandoned. The play seems to repeat some of the moralizing we see in the satyr play The Cyclops, where the Cyclops wants to live outside of society with it's own laws. In Knemon's case, he gets punished and learns his lesson by falling into the well, and has to wait a while for help to arrive. If he had a good neighbour or a slave to help him, things could have gone better. In the beginning of the play, we see him work and struggle, which makes both his body and mind deteriorate. Since the misanthrope is a stock character, he doesn't appear as a realistic subversive political power, but is someone one can laugh at and ridicule. He is a «noveau poor» that can't handle the poverty and loneliness he has inflicted on himself. His rigidity makes him impotent as a person of power, as he is unable to move both horizontally and laterally, which is to the highest degree symbolized with his fall into the well and his crippledness by the injuries.

            Falls like that entail a lesson for the affected characters, and in The Misanthrope we witness at least two learning curves. One learning curve lies with Gorgias and the other lies with Knemon. In Gorgias' case, he, as a young man from the countryside and a protective brother, is disposed with suspicions towards potential courters that wants his sister, especially people from the polis that are expected to take advantage of people from the countryside. His aggression towards Sostratos is blinded by the power that is represented by his fine cape. The learning curve and the learnt lesson occurs  when he gets convinced that Sostratos wants to marry his sister without dowry and when Gorgias hears Sostratos' speech about money. Another learning curve can be seen with Knemon, who doesn't want help from his neighbours, and won't offer help to them. This comical rigidity and hermitage is in a large degree outside of the Aristotelian «middle way», and therefore leads to his downfall, represented by his fall into the well. When he is saved by Gorgias and talks about how far he has wandered astray from the middle path, we witnes another lesson  learnt, and can conclude that both Gorgias and Knemon has learnt something important. We can therefore presume that the new comedy is meant to be moralistic and improving upon citizens, an artform with a more or less obvious didactical intention than the more obviously «ventilating» old comedy.

            There are good grounds to claim that the new comedy's moralism is both meant to be «mimed» after, and mimetic in the Aristotelian sense, as being more realistic than the old comedy. As stated in Poetics; «Epic and tragic poetry, as well as comedy and dithyramb poetry, and most of aulos and kithara art – generally speaking- are all imitations. (Aristoteles 2008: 3) In addition, Aristotle claims that «the comedy often imitate people that are baser than present people» (Aristoteles 2008: 7), which fits the old comedy better than the new comedy, as characters in the new comedy are «baser» to a lesser extent. The old comedy's rigid character is changeable to the extent that characters get punished, even though they don't go through a transformation or development. The new comedy displays a nobler gallery of characters, a nobler language and actions, and can therefore be said to be better, didactically speaking, for the audience. Also, the comic universe, which in the old comedy is an inversion of society, where slave becomes master and master becomes slave, is substituted with a normal, if not normative world in the new comedy, where master is master, and slave is slave. In The Misanthrope we also lack an overall «funny» story, and the fun appears only in brackets within a serious and family-oriented plot.

Gender roles in the new comedy

The moralistic motif in the new comedy is also stressed in Elaine Fantham's article «Sex, Status and Survival in Hellenistic Athens: A Study of Women in New Comedy». She argues that there is a prejudice against the comedy as misogynous (Fantham 1975: 45), and says that «most of the plays of Menander which have survived are in the naturalistic tradition, ethical comedies which try to be realistic, and to apply everyday moral rules; their problem is to reconcile romance with morality.» and «the plots assume the existence of love or infatuation between the male protagonist and a girl, and set out to reconcile its demands with those of respectable society.» (Fantham 1975: 46, 52) The new comedy thus seems a moralistic interlude between the obscene old comedy and the escapist comedies of Plautus where both master and slave are in a «vacation mode». One might also call new comedy a pre-romantic comedy, since it is a comedy with love as a theme, but no or little direct romantic interaction between the lovers. Fantham explains how a romantic plot isn't easily structured around arranged marriages, and that eros before and not after marriage makes a romantic plot. In addition, Knemon's asceticism leads to him not having anyone to look after his daughter when she goes to fetch water, and he hasn't got slaves that can fetch water. (Fantham 1975: 52-53) [Simiche, the nanny?] This is the opening that makes the meeting between Sostratos and the girl possible. Fantham remarks that «the mark of utter penury was a single old woman attendant» (Fantham 1975: 62) which fits with Simiche, who herself should have fetched the water, but is helped by Knemons daughter after having lost the bucket into the well. A similar observation is made by Susan Guettel Cole, who writes that «[h]usbands and fathers kept their wives and daughters under their protection at home in pert because they did not trust them, but also because they did not trust other men. [...] Greek standards of modesty demanded that women be protected from any sort of physical contact with any man not her husband [...]» (Cole 1984: 97-98) One might therefore say that Knemon's asceticism is a character fault that endangers not only himself, but also potentially his daughter, that might meet men outside of his control.

            Kallipides' agreement to allow Sostratos to marry Knemon's daughter and Gorgias to marry Sostratos's sister is, for Fantham «[an] exceptional feature.» (Fantham 1975: 53), by which Fantham means that, in other plays, rape and pregnancy was often necessary for a father to allow his son a marriage with an unknown girl. As an explanation on the gradual development from the old comedy to the new comedy, where family life gets a dominating role, Fantham also presents another argument on the change from politics to family other than the case that the audience were not longer as involved in politics. «But tragedy was dead, and Menander's generation with their intense interest in everyday human behaviour might well feel that a domestic crisis merited serious treatment, and enabled them to achieve something approaching tragic pathos. (Fantham 1975: 71) This also tells us that comedy is still a forum to discuss actual subjects, where the normative morals are represented repeatedly in a public forum, namely on the theatre stage. Even though the subject of rape is a latent threat from Gorigas' point of view, it is nevertheless brought up as a subject in the play, and often appears as a subject in other new comedies. We can thereby get a sense of what people meant, for example, about rape at the time the plays were written: «The documentary value of these plays, it seems to me, lies in two features; the illustration of external pressure on marital partners, and the implication that thinking men now looked beyond sexual fact to sexual responsibility.» (Fantham 1975: 71)

            In Plutarch, we can read that the new comedy, represented by Menander, is neither for the too sober nor the too inebriated. The plot is also noble enough for men to meet their wives  in a noble manner later in the evening. This serves a contrast to the old comedy, which was more erotic, and better suited for the drunk. (Plutarch 1961: 83) Whether Plutarch read the same play as us, is uncertain, but his commentaries nevertheless seem to resonate with the view we ourselves get by comparing the old and new comedy. Even though women weren't likely to have been present at Menander-performances, men were present, and they would have learned through it's didadic presentation of the necessary and good conditions around romance and marriage. Susan Lape, in Reproducing Athens also claims that «Dyskolos deploys eros specifically to generate a citizen marriage.» (Lape 2004: 111) If The Misanthrope is about the reproduction of citizens, one can also see that, together with Plutarch's view of Menander, The Misanthrope seems an excellent didactic piece concerning marriage and the continuation of families. The audience can, more or less, take from the play, the necessary values needed in a family or a marriage.

Conclusion

Athenian society went through both political and cultural changes from the time of the old comedy to the time of the new comedy. Keeping Asper's linking of the theatre and it's context in mind, one might also adapt his findings about the old comedy to a reading of the new comedy. We can see that outsiders are represented negatively, and that the parallels between the romantic plot and the plot concerning Knemon's «fall» and transformation, as a moralizing story for the audience. The play stresses the necessity that love goes through the proper, official channels, and shows that the misanthrope or hermit should  conform and accept the masses. We also see that the new comedy uses exemplary actions and language meant to be adapted by the audience, while the old comedy's actions and language is something to be avoided. The didactic function of the theatre can therefore have gone through a reversing role, where the comedy has gone from being «avoidable» to exemplary.

Bibliography

Quotes from Dyskolos is taken from Arnott, W.G. Menander Vol. I Loeb Classical Library 1979

Aristoteles 2008 Poetikk Bokklubbens kulturbibliotek 2008

Asper, Markus 2005 ”Group Laughter and Comic Affirmation: Aristophanes’ Birds and the Political Function of Old Comedy”, Hyperborus 11, 2005, 5-29

Brockett, Oscar G. & Hildy, Franklin J. 2010 History of the Theatre: International Edition Pearson 2010

Douglas, Mary 1999 ”Jokes”, Implicit Meanings: Essays in Anthropology Routledge 1999

Fantham, Elaine 1975 ”Sex, Status and Survival in Hellenistic Athens: A Study of Women in New Comedy” i Phoenix Vol. 29, No. 1, 1975 44-74

Gluckman, Max 1963 Order and Rebellion in Tribal Africa: collected essays with an autobiographical introduction London 1963

Griffith, John G. 1960 ”The Distribution of Parts in Menander’s Dyskolos” The Classical Quarterly New Series, Vol. 10, No 1 Cambridge 1960

Lape, Susan 2004 Reproducing Athens: Menander’s Comedy, Democratic Culture and The Hellenistic City Princeton 2004

Lofberg, J.O. 1920 ”The Sycophant-Parasite” Classical Philology Vol. 15 No. 1 1920 s. 61-72

Menander 1962 Misantropen overs. S. Eitrem Oslo 1962

Menander 1995 The Bad-Tempered Man (Dyskolos) overs. Stanley Ireland Wiltshire 1995

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Post, L.A. 1963 ”Some Subtleties in Menander’s Dyscolus” The American Journal of Philology, Vol. 84, No. 1 1963 s. 36-51

Rees, Kelley 1910 ”The Three Actor Rule in Menander” i Classical Philology Vol 5 No. 3 1910 s. 291-302

Reger, Gary 2003 ”The Economy” i Erskine, Andrew (Ed.) A Companion to the Hellenistic World Blackwell Publishing 2003

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[1]   Gluckmann (1963) Describes the function of certain ritual acts as a «ventilsitte» when the rites invert the hierarchy of society in order to expunge the participant's stored-up aggression against the hierarchal order.